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The position of European Union Special Representative (EUSR) for Central Asia is key for 
EU-Central Asia relations. The EU’s visibility in the region remains modest, and the EUSR 
plays a central role, not only as the primary point of contact between the Central Asian 
countries and EU institutions, but also as the embodiment of and main driving force behind 
the EU’s strategy for the region. Over the last six years, Peter Burian (a Slovak national) 
and his rotating team fulfilled this mandate in a noticeably active, compelling, and effective 
manner, leaving a positive legacy. Ambassador Burian was a regular traveller to the region 
and trusted listener to official and civil society concerns alike, both in Central Asia and in 
Europe. Arguably, his biggest achievement was guiding the process of developing a new EU 
strategy for Central Asia that replaced the initial 2007 document. 
The new EUSR, Ambassador Terhi Hakala (a Finnish diplomat with broad experience in 
Eastern Europe and Central Asia), will have the opportunity to set her own priorities within 
the parameters of the mandate and the EU’s strategy. The EU has come a long way over 
the past 15 years – since the creation of the mandate of EUSR for Central Asia in 2005 and 
the launch of the first EU strategy for Central Asia in 2007 – in strengthening relations with 
Central Asian countries. However, now that cooperation mechanisms are up and running, 
and the fact that Central Asia is not a priority for the EU, there is a risk of complacency and 
inactivity. For the EU to capitalise on the time and funding invested to date, it needs to grasp 
the opportunities that occasionally come along (such as the opening of Uzbekistan) and 
react more actively to worrying trends that are gaining momentum (such as Kyrgyzstan’s 
rising authoritarianism and Kyrgyz-Tajik borderland tensions). The new EUSR’s role will be 
instrumental in spearheading these approaches on behalf of the EU.
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In order to help the new EUSR get up to speed, we have taken the liberty to briefly outline 
seven matters that Ambassador Hakala might want to consider in the fulfilment of her 
mandate:
First, be a coordinator inside the EU to assure effective coordination between delegations 
in the region and Brussels, as well as between the European Commission and the European 
External Action Service. Especially in the case of the latter, there is room to improve the 
precarious balance between the EU’s foreign policy and development aid. Whereas the 
EUSR might not have a direct say over these matters, she can help rally officials around 
common interests and ideas.
Second, inform national capitals about the EU’s activities in Central Asia, and more 
importantly, try to spark interest from EU member states and other European countries, 
foremost Norway, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. Overall, European interest in 
Central Asia is low, and European countries are happy to have their affairs in Central Asia 
managed by Brussels (possibly excluding economic interests in Kazakhstan), but they are 
also keen to be kept informed about what the EU does, and they are occasionally willing to 
make (modest) national contributions. So, EUSR (virtual) travel should include Madrid and 
Warsaw next to Dushanbe and Tashkent. 
Third, focus primarily on Europe and Central Asia, but do not lose touch with other important 
actors in the region. Direct cooperation with so-called non-like-minded actors, such as China 
and Russia, may not be likely to materialise in the short term, but dialogue and exchange 
of information with these actors makes sense, not least to defuse geopolitical tensions and 
inspire a more cooperative environment in and around the region. Meanwhile, cooperation 
with the ‘like-minded’ United States is also modest, as Brussels and Washington both 
attach little priority to the region. Be aware that geopolitical actors involved in Central Asia 
continuously risk being played off by each other and by Central Asian leaders. 
Fourth, build a network in Central Asia on which you can rely in times of crisis. Of course, the 
EUSR has access to the EU delegations in Central Asian capitals, but next to that, she should 
have her own local network of Central Asian civil servants, community representatives, 
opinion-makers, activists, and researchers. It is also important to have contacts outside 
of the capitals to be able to get information quickly in case of emergencies (where the EU 
might play a positive role). The case of the conflicts on the border between Kyrgyzstan and 
Tajikistan (or ten years ago, the unrest and violence in Osh, Kyrgyzstan) is a case in point, as 
there is little European intelligence on what exactly is happening on the ground; what are 
the drivers of conflict, who are the stakeholders, and so on.   
Fifth, engage with the Central Asian leaderships, but do not hesitate to hold them to account. 
Do not shy away from advertising the importance of the rule of law, good governance, and 
social justice, and advocate human rights as a non-negotiable bottom line of relations. 
However, refrain from acting as a ‘teacher’ and treat Central Asian leaders as equal partners. 
Try to inspire and support ways for Central Asian countries to develop their own (locally 
understood and embedded) models of democracy based on good governance and the rule 
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of law. In the coming period, the EUSR will need to pay close attention to Kyrgyzstan. Once 
praised as an isle of democracy in the region, Kyrgyzstan is now at severe risk of extreme 
democratic backsliding following the take-over by the new president and a hastily pushed 
through new constitution that turns back the clock for the mountainous republic.
Sixth, maintain a close partnership with civil society, and more specifically, continue to include 
them in the EU’s policies towards the region, both as stakeholders and as beneficiaries, and 
help cement cooperation between European and Central Asia civil society. The initiative 
by Ambassador Burian to organise annual civil society fora can be seen as an important 
achievement and offers specific opportunities to further strengthen ties with civil society. 
The 2019 EU strategy for Central Asia highlights civil society’s involvement, with particular 
attention to research cooperation. It would be helpful if the EUSR also contributed to 
securing European funding for such endeavours by societal organisations and think tanks 
from Central Asia and Europe. 
Seventh, within her mandate, the EUSR has leeway to advance specific priorities for issues 
that warrant further attention. This allows the EUSR to leave her mark on the relatively new 
and modest relationship between both regions. Pierre Morel (2006-12) did so by putting 
emphasis on high-level security cooperation, while Patricia Flor (2012-14) sought to bring 
gender equality to the EU-Central Asia agenda, and Peter Burian emphasised the role of 
civil society. The list of possible issues is endless, but some prominent examples include 
boosting EU support for the development of education, and healthcare. More specifically, 
emphasis could be put on the question of how to help protect and empower vulnerable 
groups in Central Asia, including women and disabled people. 
With a strong mandate, an ambitious EU strategy for Central Asia and the guidance of 
these pointers, the new EUSR for Central Asia should be able to hit the ground running. 
Undoubtedly, civil society in Europe and Central Asia is ready to support these efforts.
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